Davide Genini (Dublin City University)

On 6 December, the US Senate failed to pass the National Security Supplemental Request, which included $106 billion (€98 billion) in financial aid for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan. ‘Today’s vote is going to be long remembered’ – said President Biden in his remarks – ‘And history is going to judge harshly those who turn their back on freedom’s cause’.[1] Biden’s call for urgent responsibility failed to assuage Republican concerns about out-of-control borders. In a vote that fell roughly along party lines – 49 to 51 – the Senate fell short of the sixty votes needed to take up the bill. As a result, what should have been a simple procedural vote in the Senate quickly became a tool to block aid to Ukraine and inject the current border crisis into the debate. As the Republican speaker, Mike Johnson, pointed out in a letter to Office of Management and Budget Director Shalanda Young dated 5 December, ‘supplemental Ukraine funding is dependent upon enactment of transformative change to our nation’s border security laws’.[2] Republicans seized on Ukraine’s role in the bill, which amounted to $61 billion (€57 billion), and demanded that these funds be redirected to border control, including the construction of a border wall in the wake of former President Trump’s administration, as the only way out of the congressional impasse. Despite Biden’s willingness to reach a bipartisan compromise ‘to fix a broken immigration system, because we know, we all know, it’s broken’,[3] congressional action on additional funding for Ukraine by the end of the year is highly unlikely.

Against this backdrop, three main risks are on the horizon. First, the failure to pass the bill is counterproductive to the US’s own security self-interest. Indeed, some of the funds earmarked for Ukraine would have been used to meet the Pentagon’s critical security needs by replenishing the stockpiles of weapons already provided. Second, after two years of unconditional and steady supplies of arms and ammunition, US aid to Ukraine is running out. Therefore, failure to provide Ukraine with new military capabilities ‘give[s] Putin the greatest gift he could hope for’[4] and could lead to a Russian attack on a NATO member, triggering Article V of the Washington Treaty, as President Biden has suggested. Third, the lack of consensus in Congress undermines US credibility in the world, with the possibility of relinquishing its ‘global leadership not just to Ukraine, but beyond that’.[5] If Ukraine’s largest single donor, with $75 billion (€70 billion) in aid to date, including more than $46 billion (€43 billion) in military assistance, pulls out, ‘what’s the rest of the world going to do? What’s Japan going to do, which is supporting Ukraine now? What’s going to happen in terms of the G7? What’s going to happen in terms of our NATO Allies?’.[6] The historic image of the US as a reliable and long-standing partner in the world is under strain.

The Senate’s decision not to provide the Ukrainian armed forces with new resources reflects a sense of ambiguity that is currently also pervading the EU headquarters in Brussels. The European political scenario is becoming increasingly contradictory. Hungary has prevented the EU from disbursing the eighth tranche of military aid under the European Peace Facility (EPF) since June 2023, recently threatened to veto any future EU plan to provide financial assistance to Ukraine, and demanded that Ukraine’s EU membership be taken off the agenda of the December European Council[7] because ‘It is clear that the proposal of the European Commission on Ukraine’s EU accession is unfounded and poorly prepared’ – said Hungary’s Prime Minister Orbán on X. The EU’s historic decision to support Ukraine with a €50 billion package for the period 2024-2027, to be approved by EU leaders by the end of this year under the name ‘Ukraine Facility’, is in danger of not getting the green light. The meeting between the Hungarian embassy in Washington and a group of US Republicans at the Heritage Foundation think-tank in Washington reflects the changing mood on the right wing of US and EU policy on continuous, long-term aid to Ukraine. In addition, the formation of Slovakia’s new executive, led by Robert Fico, who campaigned on a platform of stopping military aid to Ukraine and renegotiating sanctions against Russia, combined with the victory of the far-right party in the Netherlands, raises questions about the future of EU military aid to Ukraine.

In conclusion, the US and the EU are fighting over funding for Ukraine. As a matter of fact, the longer the US-EU stalemate continues, the less likely it is that Ukraine will be able to defend itself. The ‘Western’ stalemate reveals an undoubted momentum of fatigue towards a war that is lasting longer than expected and after the slow counter-offensive of Ukraine. ‘Wars develop in phases,’ –said NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, commenting on Ukraine’s battlefield results  –  and ‘we should also be prepared for bad news’.[8] The inability to deliver arms and ammunition to Ukraine is cemented by the lack of political unity in the two largest donors of military aid to Ukraine. Moreover, the delays in the rapid deployment of weapons are incompatible with what Ukraine desperately needs to withstand Russian pressure during the current freezing winter months.

At the same time, this impasse comes at a crucial moment for the political fortunes of both the US and the EU. Both face political elections in November and June 2024 respectively, which could change both the level and nature of support for Ukraine over the next four and five years. Whatever happens, one thing is clear: Ukraine’s long-term support is more uncertain than ever. All we can do is wait.

[1] Available at: < https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/12/06/remarks-by-president-biden-urging-congress-to-pass-his-national-security-supplemental-request-including-funding-to-support-ukraine/>.

[2] Available at: <https://punchbowl.news/2023-12-04-smj-letter-to-omb-re-border-security/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Punchbowl%20News%20Special%20Edition%20PREMIUM%205&utm_term=Premium%20List%20USE%20ME%20Through%20Oct%207>.

[3] Cit. (No 1)

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/council-president-charles-michel-cut-china-trip-short-as-hungary-viktor-orban-issues-fresh-threat-on-ukraines-eu-bid/>

[8] Available at: <https://www.ardmediathek.de/video/tagesschau24/exlusiv-interview-mit-nato-generalsekretaer-stoltenberg-nach-dem-grossangriff-russlands-ist-die-lage-fuer-die-ukraine-kritisch/tagesschau24/Y3JpZDovL3RhZ2Vzc2NoYXUuZGUvYzUwM2RlZWYtNjNkOS00ZmI5LWJlN2ItYjViM2IyNGI4YWMx>.

 

Copyright: © European Union 2023 – Source : EP

 

The views expressed in this blog reflect the position of the author and not necessarily that of the Brexit Institute Blog.