Magdalena Góra (Jagiellonian University)*
On 15th of October 2023 Poles massively went to vote and gave victory to the three democratic opposition parties. The electoral turnout of 74,38% was the highest since the June 1989 elections which ended Communist rule in the country (all results from the Polish Electoral Committee website, pkw.gov.pl). The mobilization of young urbanite voters was decisive for overthrowing the ruling populist right-wing Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, Law and Justice). In one of Wrocław’s (the city located in western Poland) electoral committees, the queue for voting was so long (and formed before 9 p.m., the official closing of the polls), that the last vote was cast there at 3 a.m. Thousands of citizens were patiently waiting in a long line, fed pizzas brought by concerned fellow citizens. The image of young, determined, and concerned citizens, many of whom are voting for the first time, represents well the dynamics of the elections. The votes in that single committee were mostly cast for the opposition, and PiS received less than 10% of the votes.
Even though PiS received 35,38% of votes, the single largest share, it was Koalicja Obywatelska (KO, Civic Coalition), Trzecia Droga (TD, The Third Way), and Nowa Lewica (NL, New Left), composing the democratic opposition, that received together 53,71% (and 248 votes in the 460-seated Sejm), representing more than 11 million votes. Exit poll results that arrived on Sunday evening indicated that PiS lost a ruling majority and that the opposition will most likely form a new government. The far right-wing Konfederacja (Confederation) received just above 7%, and even if, under an unlikely scenario, they joined PiS attempts to form a ruling coalition, the two would be short of MPs to form a majority in the new parliament. The democratic opposition performance in elections to Senat—the upper house—was even more victorious, delivering 66 seats in the 100-deputy chamber for the Senate Pact—a predefined list of one opposition candidate in each electoral district.
The electoral results brought hope to democrats in Poland and in Europe because the events in Poland proved that even if the electoral competition was not fully equal for all participants, the elections could be won by the democratic opposition. Many observers noted that in creeping state capture, PiS was receiving an electoral advantage by controlling the state-owned media that brutally attacked the democratic opposition and Donald Tusk in particular. The state-owned companies were heavily subsidizing the campaign, and the decision to hold at the same time a referendum that mostly focused on migration enabled the channelling of additional funds for the ruling party’s campaign (Styczyńska 2023). Despite the unequal conditions for competition, the opposition leaders were able to dictate the topics for the campaign and ultimately mobilize the voters.
Interestingly, during the campaign, European integration seemed to be less politicized by both camps than in previous elections. The democratic opposition was warning of a possible Polexit prepared by PiS, and the latter was threatening its voters with German dictates in the Union, but other topics on how to fix the economic and social issues in the country dominated the campaign. In many instances, the opposition leaders – and KO leader Donald Tusk specifically – were deliberately escaping from othering narratives of the culture war imposed by the PiS campaign and rather calling for limiting the internal divides. The electoral “love offensive” – focusing on community reassuring and drafting plans for a better future – became a signature style of the opposition, contrasting with the negative tropes in the PiS approach. The everyday, hour-long, digressive, and multi-thematic speeches by Donald Tusk during open meetings with supporters in all corners of the country while engaging in dialogues with citizens became a novel campaigning style.
Two groups were specifically responsible for the electoral results in Poland. Mobilized youth were already mentioned. The second group was women, often undecided or inactive voters in previous elections. Enraged by the strict anti-abortion laws introduced by PiS, women mobilized and contributed to the high turnout and possibly the opposition victory.
Many wonder what will happen next and what the prospects are for the new government in Poland. In the following days, according to the Polish Constitution, the President of the Republic Andrzej Duda (from PiS) will nominate a candidate for prime minister who will try to build a ruling majority of 231 votes in the 460-seat Sejm. According to customary practice, the mandate first goes to the leader of the party that received the biggest number of votes, hence to PiS. However, since PiS’s chances of forming the government are fairly slim, if they are not able to deliver a confidence vote for prime minister, the mandate will be given by the Sejm leader (not the President anymore), most likely elected by three democratic opposition parties, to their candidate. This will certainly take some time before the new government is formed, even though the winning leaders call on the president to immediately nominate the leader of the new winning coalition. No matter what the president does or how long it takes to form a new government, the future will be marked by two key factors.
Firstly, the new government will be formed by a broad coalition of diverse actors. The three opposition parties and electoral coalitions represent a wide range of political parties and differ significantly as regards economic and worldview issues ranging from the left to the center of the political spectrum. It is important to note that Koalicja Obywatelska and Trzecia Droga are electoral coalitions made of many smaller units, as is the party Nowa Lewica, which recently united three leftist political parties. Altogether, the elections in Poland were won by a strategically combined three-block constellation of ten parties. Many of the leaders are expressing high ambitions when it comes to their role in the new government. Hence, the government and the new ruling coalition might be unstable and prone to internal conflicts, which PiS will capitalize on in order to undermine the government’s legitimacy. Their strategy might be to undermine such a government and maybe push toward snap general elections.
The second critical issue that will determine the future of the forthcoming government will be how to strengthen Polish democracy and undo many of the systemic changes limiting the independence of the judiciary, dismantling checks and balance in the political system, weakening parliament against the executive, and many more issues that PiS has pursued over the years. These will not be easy tasks, as the government will need to overcome the likely vetoing power of the President and find a way to strengthen democratic safety measures such as restoring an independent Constitutional Tribunal and at the same time deliver on electoral promises. The opposition parties were also promising on the campaign trail that they are eager to hold the leaders of PiS accountable when it comes to many previous scandals, corruption incidents, and unlawful actions of the ruling party. This is also an uneasy and unprecedented task.
There is also an ambitious reform plan for the first hundred days, but how this will be agreed upon by the broad coalition of partners is yet to be seen. There is certainly one common agenda that the new government would like to pursue, and that is good news for Europe. What certainly KO, TD, and NL have in common is their pro-European views (for more, see this report (Góra, Thevenin, and Zielińska 2023)), locating the improvement of relations with Brussels, and repairing the Polish position on the European scene, which are very high on their agenda. The new government’s first goal will be to unlock the Recovery Fund resources for Poland blocked by the ongoing rule of law crisis manufactured by PiS. It is to be expected that many fronts of disagreement between Warsaw and Brussels will be very soon closed and fixed. The government, using the experience and position of Donald Tusk (whatever his position in such a government will be), will focus on regaining a central position in the European game and repairing relations with European allies. Poland will most likely reinvigorate relations with Ukraine that were negatively marked by growing conflicts with the PiS government in recent weeks and strengthen Polish support for the enlargement process within the EU.
Sources:
Góra, Magdalena, Elodie Thevenin, and Katarzyna Zielińska, eds. 2023. What Future for Europe? Political Actors’ Narratives on European Integration and Democracy in National Parliaments (2015-2021). EU3D Report no 10. https://www.eu3d.uio.no/publications/eu3d-reports/eu3d-report-10-góra.html.
Styczyńska, Natasza. 2023. “Conflict or Conciliation? The Polish Elections of 2023 and Their Consequences for the EU.” Swedish Institute of Policy Analysis. 2023. https://www.sieps.se/en/publications/2023/conflict-or-conciliation-the-polish-elections-of-2023-and-their-consequences-for-the-eu/.
*Magdalena Góra is Associate Professor of political science and European studies at the Institute of European Studies of the Jagiellonian University. Her research deals with legitimacy and contestation in the European Union’s external relations, EU actorness in international relations, especially in the EU’s close neighbourhood, and democracy challenges in the EU. She has published numerous journal articles (Cambridge Review of International Relations, East European Politics & Societies, European Security, Religion, State & Society), book chapters and co-edited volumes.
Photo credits: European Union, 2023
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