Federico Fabbrini (Full Professor of EU Law, DCU; Founding Director, Brexit Institute)
The summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Vilnius, Lithuania, on 11 and 12 July 2023 constitutes an important turning point for European integration and transatlantic relations. The Russian war of aggression in Ukraine, which started now 500+ days ago, has so far brought a shocking degree of violence and devastation and shattered the expectations of a perpetual peace in Europe, with profound consequences for both NATO and the European Union (EU). The meeting of the NATO heads of state and government in Vilnius addressed matters which are both specific to the military alliance and indirectly have implications beyond defense.
Based on the final communiqué of the NATO summit, three main decisions were taken in Vilnius. First, the most important decision – considering that NATO is first and foremost a defensive alliance for the now-31 states that are members of the Washington Treaty – is the upgrade of the military operational plans of NATO forces to defend every inch of the alliance’s territory. In fact, adjusting upwards the commitment made in the 2014 Wales summit, NATO members have also agreed to reach “at least” 2% of GDP spending on defense, and to go beyond this target for as long as it is necessary “in order to remedy existing shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order”.
Second, the most controversial decision taken in Vilnius, as is well known, concerns Ukraine and its relationship with NATO. Here allied countries confirmed that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO” but fell short of offering a specific accession timeline for the war-torn country. Rather, reaffirming the commitment made at the 2008 Bucharest summit “that Ukraine will become a member of NATO”, the alliance stated that “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met”. However, NATO agreed to drop the membership action plan requirement for Ukraine, it upgraded cooperation between the parties through the creation of a new NATO-Ukraine Council, and significantly stepped up its support for Ukraine with “a substantial package of expanded political and practical support.”
Nevertheless, arguably the third, most consequential decision taken in Vilnius is the admission of Sweden into NATO. As is well known, Sweden had applied to join NATO with Finland in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but Turkiye had stalled the accession process to blackmail the alliance. Following a deal brokered by NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg ahead of the NATO summit, however, Turkish President Ergodan removed his veto on Swedish accession, paving the way for its entry as the 32nd member of the alliance.
Sweden’s accession to NATO has profound consequences — especially for Ireland. Until the explosion of the war in Ukraine, Sweden was one of 6 EU member states which embraced neutrality and remained outside of NATO. With Sweden and Finland into NATO, however, only Ireland, Malta, Cyprus and Austria now remain outside of it. Moreover, ahead of the NATO summit Austria (together with Switzerland, a non-EU member state which has a long tradition of neutrality) agreed to join a German-led air-defense shield, confirming that neutrality is ever more untenable in the current geo-political context, and thus putting more pressure on hold-out states like Ireland which are struggling to chart a consensual path forward.
Moreover, Sweden’s accession to NATO matters enormously for the EU too — for at least two reasons. On the one hand, Turkiye’s decision to remove its veto on Sweden’s NATO accession was also conditioned on, and facilitated by, European Council President Charles Michel’s agreement to reboot EU-Turkiye relations, with a re-opening of Turkiye’s EU accession negotiations. As is well known, Turkiye has been a candidate member of the EU since the 1980s, but accession talks have been effectively on hold for a decade, following the authoritarian backsliding in Ankara. In fact, the European Commission was quick to point out that NATO and the EU are separate organizations, with specific entry rules and procedures, and that therefore no connection can be made between the two. Yet, the reassurances secured by Erdogan are not insignificant, potentially affecting the future of EU enlargement beyond the planned accession of Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans.
On the other hand, Sweden’s entry into the military alliance reaffirms an ever more obvious division of responsibilities between the EU and NATO. Certainly, the war in Ukraine prompted the EU to enhance the Common Security & Defense Policy (CSDP). Nevertheless, it appears increasingly clear that NATO remains so far the only credible military defense organization in the European security architecture, with the EU playing rather the important role of a paymaster for defense, military procurement and post-war reconstruction.
In fact, the most significant developments in CFSP are mostly connected to funding instruments: since the explosion of the war in Ukraine the Council has consistently deployed the European Peace Facility (EPF), now amounting to €12bn, to provide funding for weapons to Ukraine; the Council and the EP approved the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), worth €0.5bn, for the common procurement of military equipment; and the Commission has proposed the establishment of a new Ukraine Facility, worth €50bn, to fund the Ukrainian government in the 2024-27 period with credible financial commitments beyond the Macro-Financial Assistance Instrument for 2023.
In conclusion, the NATO summit in Vilnius marks a turning point both for European integration and transatlantic cooperation. While Ukraine’s accession to NATO has been pushed back in time, with Sweden’s entry into the military alliance NATO is confirmed as the core security organization for the European continent, binding the United States (US) – as the largest provider of military security – to the future of Europe. Yet, this has consequences for the EU too — not only because it potentially reopens the prospect of a major enlargement towards Turkiye, but also because it re-defines the role of the EU and its involvement in fiscal-military integration. Whether this settlement is tenable or not, only the new US presidential elections will tell.
Copyright: © European Union, 2023
The views expressed in this blog reflect the position of the author and not necessarily that of the Brexit Institute Blog.