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A Snap Election at the Start of Spain’s Council Presidency

Gisela Hernández (IPP-CSIC)

On 1 July 2023, the Spanish government took over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The Presidency rotates each 6 months among the member states and offers national governments a privileged position to shape the EU agenda, albeit constrained by the obligation of acting as an “honest broker”. However, on May 29 Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called a snap election after his Socialist party suffered heavy losses in regional and local elections. The unusual summer election, to be held on July 23, could see the right-wing Popular Party return to power and affect the smooth functioning of Spain’s Council Presidency if it has to negotiate a government with the far-right party Vox.

The agenda of the Spanish Presidency

The agenda of the Spanish Presidency, established long before the election was called, is structured around four priorities, all of them closely related to the worries and demands of Spanish citizens. Spanish society is, in general terms, very favourable to the EU: Spaniards usually trust the EU’s leading responses more than national ones, and support further progress in the EU integration process(See, for example, the results in the recent Summer 2022 Eurobarometer.)

The first priority, entitled “reindustrialising the EU and ensuring its open strategic autonomy”, focuses on creating a less vulnerable and dependent Europe. By revitalising existing industries and attracting new ones, it aims to foster the development of key sectors such as renewable energies, digital technologies, pharmaceuticals and others. This priority also seeks to diversify the EU’s trade partnerships, with a special focus on Latin America, a traditional key partner for Spain.

Secondly, the Spanish Presidency will focus on “advancing in the green transition and environmental adaptation”. This priority aims not only to maintain and strengthen the EU’s global green leadership, but also to reduce its dependence on imports of energy and raw materials. In order to do so, the Spanish government seeks to advance several legislative proposals of the Fit for 55 package.

The third priority, named “promoting greater social and economic justice”, is in line with the social democratic character of the Spanish government, as the aim is to fight inequalities and improve citizens’ living conditions through economic redistribution. This priority puts the focus on combating fiscal fraud, as well as on the ambitious objective of reforming the EU’s fiscal rules.

Finally, the fourth priority seeks to “strengthen European unity”, not only to reinforce the response to the various crises it faces, but also to articulate the new global order, as an alternative to the traditional bipolar narrative of China-US competition. The Spanish Presidency seeks to deepen the internal market, enhance the banking union and promote a sustainable financial agenda. It also aims to delve the objectives of the EU’s strategic agenda, particularly throughout the conclusion of the new migration and asylum pact.

The Spanish-Belgium-Hungary Trio

Aiming to maintain a certain degree of continuity and coherence in their work, the three member states that consecutively hold the Council Presidency group together to coordinate with each other in a “trio” agreeing on an 18-month agenda. Coordination among the Spanish-Belgium-Hungary trio has not been without controversy. The Hungarian government does not, in principle, appear as an easy partner: it has blocked several EU initiatives in recent years, particularly those related to the Union’s response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine (such as the sanctions and aid packages), and is one of only two EU member states (with Poland) subject to an Art. 7 procedure for its systematic violation of the rule of law. In its resolution of 1 June, the European Parliament (EP) questioned the ability of the Hungarian government to carry out the task of the Presidency given the serious rule of law deficiencies in this member state.

However, the removal of Hungary from the Council presidency appears as a very unlikely, even impossible option, and, in fact, the trio presented its coordinated programme on 20 June. Spanish authorities have not commented on the EP resolution. However, Viktor Orbán is an uncomfortable partner for the Spanish government, not only due to his controversial position regarding the war, but also because of his close ties with the Spanish far-right party Vox.

Spain General Election

Spain faces a general election on 23 July. The result of the election will be decisive for Spain’s Council Presidency, as it might imply a change of government. President Pedro Sánchez (PSOE) has already affirmed that the work for preparing the Presidency has been carried out for more than a year, in collaboration with all the political actors. Conversely, the leader of the opposition, Alberto Nuñez Feijóo (PP), has claimed that he “does not have a single piece of information” on the plans of the actual government for the Presidency. However, he has already announced his team of experts who would be in charge of assuming the responsibilities of the Presidency if there is a change of government.

Nevertheless, the continuity of the agenda of the Presidency may be endangered if the centre-right PP wins the election without a sufficient majority to form a government. In this case, it would need to make an alliance with the far-right party Vox, a situation that has already occurred in several regional governments after the 28 May regional elections. Vox politicians have repeatedly denied climate change and gender violence, and have shown a confrontational attitude towards LGTBI+ rights and immigration.

The outcome of the elections is thus key, not only because Spain could mean another case of a far-right party in national government, but also because this could fundamentally jeopardise the Spanish Presidency’s agenda and the compromises it could make.

 

 

Gisela Hernández (bio)

Gisela Hernández graduated in International Relations (UCM, 2019, Honours) and holds a Master in European Union (San Pablo CEU University, 2020). She is currently developing her Ph.D. project on rule of law enforcement in the European Union at the Institute of Public Goods and Policies of the Spanish National Research Council (IPP-CSIC) and Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM) (FPU contract). She takes part in the InDeComply Research Project (funded by the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación). She collaborated in the H2020 RECONNECT Project as a research associate. Previously, she worked at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) Madrid Office, researching on migration and border management issues in the EU. She has published in Politics and Governance and Hague Journal on the Rule of Law.

 

Photo credits: Spanish Presidency, Council of the European Union

The views expressed in this blog reflect the position of the author and not necessarily that of the Brexit Institute Blog.