Federico Fabbrini (DCU Brexit Institute)
The Russian military invasion of Ukraine, which commenced on the night of 23/24 February 2022, constitutes a turning point in the history of Europe, with lasting consequences for the future of the European Union (EU). The war of aggression waged by Russia against a sovereign state brings back the memory to what British historian Eric Hobsbawm aptly called the Age of Extremes, to refer to the dramatic first half of the 20th century. Since the end of World War II, the international security architecture had been built on a set of rules and institutions designed to preserve stability and prevent aggressive wars. And since the end of the Cold War, Europe had experienced an enduring period of peace, driven by the transition to democracy and a market economy. In fact, the very project of European integration had been inspired from day 1 from the aim to make war on the European continent not only unthinkable, but also impossible — as famously proclaimed in the Schuman Declaration. And the progressive enlargement of the EU had enticed policy makers to believe that the EU integration model would exclude war from the European continent for good.
The rolling of tanks into Ukraine and the shelling of its capital Kyiv have shattered this expectation, suggesting that ‘the end of history’ which Francis Fukuyama spoke about is over. The return of war in the European continent came as a shock for European citizens and leaders alike, exposing the weaknesses of the current EU settlement, and calling for urgent action. Admittedly, the EU had weathered a number of significant crises recently. In the last decade, the EU had to face the migration-crisis, which threatened the functioning of its internal free movement zone; the euro-crisis, which called into question the sustainability of its single currency; the rule of law crisis, with growing threats to its foundational values in a number of illiberal member states; and Brexit — the first ever case in which a member state decided to leave the EU. Nevertheless, none of these crises was of a military nature; and despite the prescient warning coming from the United States administration the EU had lazily assumed a war could never occur on its continent again.
The shock has prompted a strong response at EU and international level. In coordination with the US, NATO and its allies, the EU has deployed rapidly a series of measures to sanction Russia, and support Ukraine’s resistance. In a matter of days, at the behest of the European Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy, the EU Foreign Affairs Council approved a swath of restrictive measures against Russian officials and operatives, banned Russian flights from EU airspace and approved for the first time ever the joint EU purchase and transfer of weapons to Ukraine. In fact, the shock reverberated at the national level too, with Germany committing to now increase defense spending to 2% of GDP (a target unanimously agreed by NATO in 2009, which Germany and most other EU members of the alliance had willfully neglected) and Finland considering joining NATO.
Nevertheless, important challenges remain ahead for the EU. As my DCU colleague Ken McDonagh has pointed out, the EU approach to security and defence remains mired in an old-style incremental logic — most visible in the long-awaited strategic compass, a document which is outdated before being even published. And the path-dependency of intergovernmental coordination continues to challenge the EU’s ability to act with the same vigor as the US — as evident in the night European Council meeting of 24 February, which resulted in a vocal condemnation of Russia but limited operational action. Indeed, even the deployment for the first time of the European Peace Facility to procure military supplies to Ukraine is an instance of intergovernmental governance, since the Facility is established off-EU budget, subject to unanimous agreement by the member states, and endowed with an annual financial ceiling of circa €500mn — peanuts in military terms.
The war in Ukraine should prompt the EU to profoundly rethink its purpose and its functioning. Unions of states and citizens usually emerge to face collectively external threats, and must endow themselves with the institutional and financial means to successfully address these. A national race to re-armament is not what EU member states should do. Rather, they should eventually realize that only a joint EU military capacity can guarantee the security interest of its member states, and an enduring peace in its neighborhood. Moreover, the EU should be able to raise the resources to achieve this objective — and here the €750bn “Next Generation EU” recovery fund provides a perfect model to be replicated. Rather than resorting to special purpose vehicles like the European Peace Facility — with limited money, and cumbersome governance — the EU should fund itself issuing bonds, and use the revenues to fund the development of a collective deterrent force. The idea of an “EU army” may have been a political taboo till Wednesday last week. But we can now all see that certainly EU comitology and strategic documents cannot stop Russian tanks.
If the idea that the EU can be a soft power only is now buried for good, the exigencies of hard power also compel the EU to rethink its relationship with the UK. Brexit left a deep legacy of distrust between the parties — and the continuing quarrels over the Northern Ireland Protocol have done nothing to defuse it. But the UK and the EU do still share a similar worldview, inspired by mutual belief in democracy, freedom and the rule of law. Faced with external military threats, these two partners should therefore make a rapprochement, and indeed cooperation on security and defense could be the impetus for a new start in the relationship. As such, the EU and the UK should quickly move to fill the gap left by the rudimentary Trade & Cooperation Agreement and strike a new security treaty, with formalized institutional structures, a mutual defense pledge and alignment on sanctions.
It is no exaggeration to say that the history of Europe is at an inflection point — but, as in the past, in crises there are opportunities for the EU to renew itself and refocus. The dividends of European integration are there for all too see — an area of peace, freedom and democracy like no other on earth. But as the Russian war of aggression makes crystal clear this state of affairs is not God-given; it must be protected, and it is time for the EU to take care of it. While the support of the US will remain crucial, with NATO an indispensable force at least in the short term, the EU must be able to secure its defense. This is what sovereignty is all about, as French President Emmanuel Macron has long argued. But a sovereign Europe requires a profound revision of its inadequate decision-making and fund-raising structures, with an ambitious leap forward towards a federal governance, with a real executive power, and autonomous military means. As the Conference on the Future of Europe winds down, the need to reform the EU constitutional system which underpinned this initiative has only grown stronger. The age of adolescence for the EU is over, and it’s time for the member states to grow it up to the challenges of this brave new world.
Federico Fabbrini is a Full Professor of EU Law at Dublin City University and the Founding Director of the Brexit Institute.
The views expressed in this blog reflect the position of the author and not necessarily that of the Brexit Institute Blog.