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The Sea Standoff that Never Was: What Drove Irish Fishers to Challenge the Russian Navy?

Ciarán O’Driscoll (European Movement Ireland)

International events rarely remain local. The Japanese–Russian War of 1904–1905 came about due to ambitions by both sides in north-west China and Korea. The Russian Pacific fleet was devastated early in the war, with the Baltic fleet ordered to provide support and relief.

The Russian Baltic fleet departed from the port of Liepāja, in what is now Latvia, in October 1904 to begin making the journey of some 13,700 nautical miles (nm) or 25,300km to Russia’s far eastern territory. As it sailed through the Baltic Sea, it received rather far-fetched warnings that Japanese torpedo boats could be disguised as fishing trawlers in the North Sea. 

On a foggy night of 21 October, believing to have sighted such vessels while in the North Sea, several navy ships opened fired on these targets for some twenty minutes.

What they had in fact fired upon was a fleet of fishing boats from Hull who were making their way to the Dogger Bank. Two men were killed, six were seriously injured, after one boat had been sunk and five more were damaged.

The event at the Dogger Bank led to a serious diplomatic incident between the United Kingdom and Russia. However, after investigating the incident, Russia paid compensation to the fishermen and this tragic accident moved quietly into history.

Moving not so quietly into and now out of Irish waters are some of the largest ships in the Russian Navy. On 20 January, Russia announced that it would be carrying out military exercises at sea involving some 140 ships, 40 aircraft and 10,000 personnel in areas such as the North Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk and off the Irish coast over the coming weeks.

These trials came at a time of increased tensions between Russia and Western countries over the military build-up by Russian on the border with Ukraine, and it is hard not to link the two together.

The now withdrawn Marine Notice (No. 06 of 2022) from the Department of Transport stated that the Russian “exercises will include the use of naval artillery and launching of rockets” between 3 – 8 February.

A map and co-ordinates in the Marine Notice highlight where the trails were originally scheduled to take place. In consulting topography maps from the Marine Institute, these drills were to take place at the Goban Spur, a remote plateau area on Ireland’s continental shelf, south of the Porcupine Bank and Porcupine Seabight.

The Goban Spur is about 160nm (300km) south-west of the Mizen Head, which is within Ireland’s 200nm (370km) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Ireland jointly established its own EEZ with the other EU Member States in 1977. The 1964 London Fisheries Convention had established the 12nm (22km) territorial waters area around Ireland and other European states.

The Goban Spur forms part of a shallow continental shelf within Ireland’s EEZ, an area that is biologically rich and diverse and plays an often critically important role in the life cycle of many fish stocks. As a result, it is an area that is key for Ireland’s sea fishing industry.

And it is here that international events have not remained local.

The well-publicised proposed peaceful protests by members of the Castletownbere-based Irish South and West Fish Producers Organisation (ISWFPO) against the Russian Navy, announced on 24 January, came at a time when the Irish fishing industry continues to be impacted by the EU–UK trade agreement.

By 2026, Ireland will have transferred to the UK €43m worth of fish quotas in UK waters, accounting for 15% of all Irish fish quotas. The industry says this puts an unfair level of burden sharing on Ireland, compared to other EU Member States.

From the perspective of the Irish fishing industry, the EU–UK agreement is another example of being let down by the State and the EU, whose Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), the fishing industry would say, has not delivered for it since the CFP was established in 1983. The proposed actions by the ISWFPO can be viewed as a reaction to current frustrations and challenges it faces.

Due to the current tensions between Russia and the West, the local actions of ISWFPO found themselves at the centre of international attention, with the likes of BBC, CNN, EurActiv, euobserver, The Independent, Politico, Sky News, to The Washington Post and more, covering events as they unfolded.

On 27 January, the CEO of ISWFPO, Patrick Murphy and Brendan Byrne, CEO of the Irish Fish Processors and Exporters Association (IFPEA), met Russian Ambassador to Ireland Yuri Filatov for discussions about their concerns.

On 29 January, Ambassador Filatov released a statement. In response to requests from the Irish government and the ISWFPO, the Minister for Defence Sergey Shoigu “made a decision, as a gesture of goodwill, to relocate the exercises by the Russian Navy […] outside the Irish exclusive economic zone”. “With the aim not to hinder fishing activities by the Irish vessels in the traditional fishing areas.”

The announcement came to the relief to many, as the original Department of Transport’s Marine Notice (No. 06 of 2022) stated that “vessels and crew are advised of serious safety risks in the operational area. Masters should navigate their vessel to ensure safety at all times.”

The fishers from Hull fell afoul of a tragic accident at the Dogger Bank on that foggy October night in 1904. While no tragic accident happened at the Goban Spur in 2022, this episode has focused debate on Ireland’s civilian and military capabilities on monitoring the seas around Ireland.

We should keep a keener eye on the sea: it is after all where the Atlantic rain rolls in off, and so too can the Russian Navy.

 

Originally from Castletownbere, West Cork, Ciarán O’ Driscoll is the Policy and Research Officer at European Movement Ireland.

The views expressed in this blog reflect the position of the author(s) and not necessarily that of the Brexit Institute Blog.

Image Credit: “Russian navy (2005-08-019)” by Argenberg is licensed under CC BY 2.0