Federico Fabbrini & Christy Ann Petit, DCU Brexit Institute
On 1 January 2022, France took over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU). The French presidency takes place at a key moment in the European integration process. On the one hand, the Covid-19 pandemic has allowed the EU to make a big leap forward in the last year and a half. In particular, the establishment of the “Next Generation EU” Recovery Fund, worth more than 800 billion euros at current prices, has for the first time endowed the EU with a real capacity for budgeting, spending, and increased joint borrowing and joint guarantee in debt issuance. This could have a transformational impact on the architecture of European economic governance in an increasingly federal direction. On the other hand, however, the EU continues to face several issues. As French President Emmanuel Macron stressed on 9 December 2021, in the press conference introducing the French presidency of the Council of the EU, the EU faces existential challenges in terms of climate, technology and geo-politics. In fact, in his speech at the European Parliament on 19 January 2022 in Strasbourg, President Macron recalled how Europe’s three fundamental promises – of democracy, progress and peace – are all under stress and require renewing.
In this context, the French presidency takes on an important role. Naturally, the relevance of the six-month presidency of the Council of the EU, which rotates among the 27 Member States of the European Union, has decreased in importance, especially since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. A six-month term is too short a period to allow a Member State to bring an agenda to completion, especially if it involves the adoption of EU legislative acts, which generally take longer to discuss and approve. In fact, Council presidencies work in trios, with now the French-Czech-Swedish Presidencies having shared an 18-month programme elaborating on a ‘strategic agenda’. Moreover, the six-month presidencies clash with the fact that the EU has a myriad of other presidencies, such as the Presidency of the European Council, of the Eurogroup, and of course of the Commission, which have a longer time horizon. Nonetheless, it is clear that some large and influential Member States can use the presidency of the Council as an opportunity to bring change and political ambition to the European project.
The program of the French presidency is structured around the three key concepts of puissance, relance et appartenance, and falls directly within that ambition. In fact, it is in line with the vision of the future of Europe presented by President Macron in his fundamental Sorbonne speech in 2017. Hence, the program is structured around three axes. Firstly, France aims to strengthen the sovereignty of Europe, especially in the field of foreign affairs and neighbourhood policy, but also in migration policy, with a political leadership of the Schengen area. It is also true in the domain of defence policy with a strengthening of the EU ‘strategic compass for security and defence’, which should be adopted during the French presidency. Secondly, France aims to reinforce the unity of Europe, especially in the field of economic and social policy, in order to strengthen the ecosystem and the investments necessary to support the climate and technological transition. Thirdly, France aspires to promote a democratic Europe and its values, with a humanistic approach, defending the rule of law, improving the functioning of European democracy and investing in common cultural initiatives. In that regard, in his speech opening the French Presidency at the European Parliament, President Emmanuel Macron stressed the potential addition of new fundamental rights to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, such as the protection of the environment and the recognition of the right to abortion, and more generally, invited to debate basic rights at the core of ‘our common political project’.
The French agenda is extremely ambitious, but a number of factors could favor its success. First of all, the conclusion of the Quirinale Treaty on 26 November 2021 has strengthened the bilateral link between France and Italy, codifying in legally binding terms the political alignment between these two countries on the development horizon of the EU. This creates a solid alliance between Italy and France, which can be useful to create critical mass in the EU. On the other hand, even Germany, which is historically linked to France by the bilateral cooperation treaties of 1963 and 2019, has recently expressed its support for a relaunch of the European project. Indeed, the new governing coalition has explicitly accepted in the Koalitionsvertrag the EU’s ambitious reform objectives, which, albeit with grey areas, are close to the French program. Finally, the French agenda is also aided by the Conference on the Future of Europe – itself a brainchild of President Macron, who launched it in March 2019, with results expected in May 2022. Although the impact of this exercise is still uncertain, the Conference was a useful initiative to revive the debate on the future of Europe, included in the reform program for the French Presidency. In that regard, there is an explicit commitment to promote the right of legislative initiative of the European Parliament, with the support of the German coalition – if it were recommended in the Conference on the Future of Europe’s final report.
Of course, the French presidency of the Council of the EU also faces a number of obstacles, which can undermine its success and undermine the European project. First of all, the future of France itself constitutes a question mark given that precisely during the presidency French citizens will be called to directly elect the head of state (in April 2022) and the representatives to the Assemblée Nationale (in June 2022). While there are other precedents of overlaps between six-month presidencies and elections (or government crises) in Member States holding the EU Council presidency, it is clear that a national election campaign will inevitably be a distraction that could diminish France’s capacity to lead the European debate. Beyond internal issues, there are external challenges that may threaten the French presidency: in particular, the crisis of the rule of law, through the growing clash between the European Commission and Hungary and Poland over the independence of the judiciary, has created a deep rift between East and West of Europe. However, significant differences of views survive between Northern and Southern Europe, especially on budget issues and the future of the Economic and Monetary Union, including the completion of the Banking Union and the further development of the Capital Markets Union.
In conclusion, 2022 promises to be a year full of opportunities and potential dangers for the EU. If the French presidency, inspired by the pro-European vision of President Macron, opens up a useful space for relaunching the European project, it is essential that Member States and political forces sharing the same ambitions fully engage themselves in this combat pour l’Europe against nationalist and extremist movements which aim instead to disintegrate it. And, in Robert Schuman’s words cited last week in Strasbourg, let’s use all ‘creative efforts’ to fulfil the promises of democracy, progress and peace for European citizens.
The views expressed in this blog reflect the position of the author(s) and not necessarily that of the Brexit Institute Blog.
Photo Credit: European Union, 2022