Dr. Kenneth McDonagh (Dublin City University)

As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine rumbles into its third year, there are a number of worrying gaps emerging in the European response. Military aid, while still flowing, remains below the level required to ensure victory and, recently, even the stalemate has become precarious.

Although the recent US approval of funding is welcome, the fragility of the coalition that delivered it is clear. Europe needs to plan for a less reliable transatlantic partner; starting yesterday.

The EU has staked its strategic credibility on a European future for Ukraine, but is yet to show it is truly willing to pay the costs that are required to deliver that. An occupied Ukraine cannot be an EU member state and a Russian consolidation of territory acquired by force would be a death knell for EU and NATO credibility.

In response Europe needs to move at several speeds all at once. First it needs to address the immediate requirements of Ukraine’s defence. This is not a time for squeamishness about the use of weapon systems or of the sensitivities of national defence manufacturers.  Czechia has led the way in meeting some of these gaps at pace and European funding needs to follow suit. The desire by the EU to channel funding to build EU defence capacity is well intended and necessary, but in reality that should be the secondary goal. The moment demands speed not perfection. 

The EU also needs to rationalise its approach to security and defence. Are we maximising the significant overlap between NATO and EU membership? European Strategic Autonomy is a laudable goal but there is no realistic prospect of achieving it without the United Kingdom and Central European states have made clear that NATO remains the cornerstone of their security architecture. In light of that, NATO may be the best means of realigning the UK with EU security objectives. In something of a paradox, a less reliable US partner could incentivise the creation of a stronger, if more European, NATO.

This leaves the awkward question of the remaining non-NATO EU members – Cyprus, Malta, Austria and Ireland. Cyprus’ non-alignment is unlikely to change, given the historical division of the island and the fraught relationship between Nicosia and Turkey. Malta’s neutrality, while likely to remain in place, allows for it to call on external actors to support its self-defence. However it remains outside of PESCO. Austria’s neutrality has not precluded its involvement in EU CSDP initiatives but it remains unlikely to review its stance on NATO membership. 

For Ireland, the war coincided with a period of reflection and debate on security and defence. Though the government has committed to a modest increase in defence spending and to examine the removal of the UNSC component of the ‘triple-lock’ on Irish troop deployments, it has to date ruled out greater defence integration with existing Euro-Atlantic structures. More recently, it has chafed against the issuing of EU defence bonds. 

However, the geopolitical currents set in motion by Russia’s escalation of its war in Ukraine have changed the calculus of security in Europe. Ireland’s meagre defence capabilities no longer go unnoticed. In a year of elections and change, Ireland may no longer find a welcome in Brussels if it continues to be seen as a laggard in security affairs.

Ireland needs to start to take security and defence seriously. We have major gaps in our capabilities in the air and at sea. Just as important, we lack a primary intelligence gathering capability, a robust national security clearance system and, even, a national security strategy. 

The EU provides one potential framework for addressing these gaps. NATO offers another. Between the two, a more precarious but perhaps more politically acceptable combination of bilateral and/or mini-lateral partnerships might allow Ireland to address some of these gaps –  though our lack of credibility in security and defence may make such partnerships difficult to find.

As Europe continues to evolve in the new threat environment, free-riding may no longer be an option. Ireland needs to be aware of the old European truism: “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu”. The EU security table’s entry price is rising and will continue to do so. Ireland and other small states need to take note and respond accordingly.

Kenneth McDonagh is Associate Professor of International Relations and Head of the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University. His research is focused on EU Foreign Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy, the role of small states in CSDP, and the gendered impact of CSDP missions.

The views expressed in this blog post are the position of the author and not necessarily those of the Brexit Institute blog.