Eoin Micheál McNamara, Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) | eoin.mcnamara@fiia.fi  

Donald Trump’s volatile US foreign policy – from threats to annex Greenland to war in Iran – has sent shudders through the global security system. For Western democracies elsewhere, the idea of ‘the middle power’ has returned prominently for those aiming to salvage rules-based order, multilateralism and liberal values in international politics. Speaking in Davos in January, Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney warned that US-led order based on common rules and free trade is obsolete. Carney called on democratic ‘middle powers’ to respond, not by nostalgically grieving a previous order, but by leading a de-centred multilateral evolution. In the EU, President of Finland Alexander Stubb has led with security thinking through a vision of ‘values-based realism’. Stubb raises ‘middle power’ cooperation as important for retrieving global stability.

Middle power parameters

Clarifying what constitutes ‘a middle power’ is pertinent from both international and Irish perspectives. A concept first developed in the later Cold War by Canadian academic Robert W. Cox, beyond raw material political, military and economic power, ‘middle powers’ including Australia and Canada maximised their global influence by leading cooperative initiatives fostering stable multilateralism. Minus the same material assets as great powers, broader likeminded cooperation supporting multilateralism offers smaller states opportunities to protect security aims. ‘Middle powers’ typically amplify multilateral proposals through institutions like the EU and the UN.

While Australia and Canada have relatively large populations and economies, ‘middle power’ identity is also associated with Nordic states comparable to Ireland in size and wealth. Complementing support for multilateral institutions, Nordic states prioritise ‘middle power’ contributions through voluntarism in conflict resolution. In the 1990s, Norway’s mediation helped structure the Israel-Palestine peace-process while Finland’s efforts were globally important for peace in Northern Ireland, the Balkans and in Indonesia’s autonomous Aceh province into the 2000s. Partnering with Germany, Denmark was centrally involved in safely extracting chemical weapons from Libya after 2016. Nordic states share comparable records to Ireland in contributing to both UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief.

Domestic political discourse on Irish foreign policy regularly affirms the need for ‘an honest broker’ promoting peace. Nevertheless, Irish actions have not reached Nordic yardsticks in peace mediation. Dovetailing with Stubb’s ‘values-based realism’, most Nordic states are disproportionately effective at contributing to global multilateralism while maintaining strong national defence. European partners perceive Nordic governments as maximising resources to close security gaps. The same cannot be said of Ireland. 

Leading by example

Ireland’s ‘middle power’ history stems from different logic – steadfast support for multilateral institutions matched with creative ideas to bring these institutions forward. While resolving national defence vulnerabilities exposing Ireland to hybrid threats, Dublin must also play to its international strengths to ensure its upcoming Presidency of the Council of the EU is a success by guiding the bloc towards stronger contributions that improve global multilateralism. Enhanced EU support for a UN weakened under US funding cuts to many UN agencies initiated by Trump is vital. 

Irish commitment to the UN might sometimes be read through current debates on reforming ‘triple-lock’ legislation for Defence Forces deployments. Refined by the 2006 Defence Act, ‘triple-lock’ legislation currently specifies that an Irish military deployment of over twelve soldiers overseas is approved through the executive, the lower legislative house in parliament (Dáil Éireann) and a UN-mandate. Proponents of reform argue that ‘triple-lock’ risks leaving Irish peacekeeping hostage to a deadlocked UN Security Council where a veto from one or more of its Permanent Five members might block a significant Irish deployment. For opponents, reform negatively symbolises reduced Irish support for the UN when the institution faces steep difficulty. However, behind these scenes, Irish commitment has already flagged through the decline in its military resources that has already undermined its UN peacekeeping footprint, eroding some moral standing to lead by example. 

Recruitment and retention problems in the Defence Forces combining with further commitments for EU crisis management dilute Irish peacekeeping contributions. In the 1980s, when Ireland had less wealth, it fielded its own battalion (650 personnel) with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Today, this has shrunk to around 360 personnel where Ireland relies on partners to maintain a joint battalion. Stretched thin by further commitments to a multinational EU response force, Ireland could no longer undertake the 130-strong field rotations it started in 2013 with the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights after 2023. Were Defence Forces’ establishment strength restored or expanded; Ireland could optimise both its UN and EU commitments to avoid these painful choices.

Creative but pragmatic

As the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference currently takes place at the UN in New York in April and May 2026, it is important to remember that Irish ‘middle power’ priorities have historically figured centrally in UN disarmament diplomacy. Foreign minister Frank Aiken’s ‘Irish resolutions’ before the UN General Assembly in the 1950s and 1960s contributed significantly to the NPT’s eventual implementation in 1970. 191 states are party to the NPT’s obligations today. Combining creative policy thinking with a pragmatic understanding of global power politics, Aiken knew that nuclear weapons-holding great powers required legal recognition to become the treaty’s guardians. This is a primary reason explaining the NPT endurance. 

The NPT also functions through negative stigmatisation, shaming states contemplating defiance before the international community. Contrary to pragmatism central at the NPT’s formation, recent disarmament initiatives prominently supported by Ireland, such as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) are arguably too lopsided in overly relying on negative stigmatisation without seriously engaging the balance of power when these same power dynamics continue to push proliferation risks. 

The post-Cold War nuclear security balance is evolving dangerously. Russia shared tactical nuclear weapons with Belarus in 2023. China continues to expand its nuclear arsenal. Doubts over US extended deterrence under Trump currently drives British and French aims to recalibrate nuclear deterrence in Europe while America’s East Asian allies seriously contemplate independent deterrents. This risks a new global proliferation spiral. Seen from Dublin, this should renew creative but pragmatic thinking to facilitate credible multilateralism tailored for emerging risks. Following Carney’s sentiments, adapting to a world that is now developing turbulently (and not how it has been recently) will galvanise ‘middle power’ influence where consistent leadership by example remains politically vital for smaller states.

Dr. Eoin Micheál McNamara is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki. 

This research is part of the Reignite Multilateralism via Technology (REMIT) project, funded by the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme.