Davide Genini, Dublin City University
On December 4, 2024, the Dublin European Law Institute (DELI) hosted the event European Defence Integration after the US Elections. The re-election of Donald Trump has reshaped the geopolitical context, prompting urgent discussions about how the European Union (EU) should respond to emerging global challenges in an increasingly volatile international environment.
Sylvie Goulard, Professor of Practice in Global Affairs at SDA Bocconi University and former French Minister of the Armed Forces, opened the discussion with a call for innovative thinking. Despite decades of deliberation at the EU level, tangible progress on defence integration has been limited. She emphasised that the world has become more dangerous, necessitating greater EU autonomy in its actions. As Europeans, she argued, we must consider the possibility that the US may reduce or withdraw its support for NATO: ‘America First’ is exactly what Trump advocated. The EU must take security more seriously because it is a matter of life and death – unlike other policy areas. For instance, delays in EU support to Ukraine result in Ukrainian lives being lost. If Russia were to attack European states, the EU must react within minutes and make decisions swiftly; there would be no time to establish new rules or build defences in the moment of crisis. She highlighted the multifaceted nature of modern warfare, which demands preparation across various domains, including cyber defence, disinformation, drones, and space. Currently, the EU is unprepared to confront these evolving threats. It lacks sufficient financing, capabilities, and armaments. Furthermore, Goulard urged the EU to reflect on the most appropriate levels for decision-making as European nations struggle with mutual trust. This raises a critical question: Is the EU, in its current form, equipped to address a world increasingly shaped by nationalism and aggressive rhetoric? The reality, she concluded, is that the EU must acknowledge its shortcomings and take urgent action to meet the challenges of today’s more dangerous geopolitical landscape.
The second speaker was Franz Mayer, Professor of Law at the University of Bielefeld, where he holds the chair in Public Law, European Law, Public International Law, Comparative Law, and Law and Politics. He observed that Donald Trump’s victory in the US elections will significantly alter American foreign policy. To begin with, the US is likely to reduce or withdraw its support for Ukraine, raising the possibility that Ukraine could lose its war of defence, leaving Russia in a position to directly threaten Europe. In particular, uncertainties surrounding Trump’s commitment to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty will cause alarm in the Baltic States and Poland. Most importantly, the new Trump administration is expected to reduce its support for Europe, citing the failure of European states to shoulder their fair share of the economic burden. As a result, the EU will need to take greater responsibility for its own security, though it will struggle to compensate for the diminished role of the US.
Mayer noted that security was a focus even in the early stages of European integration, but with a very different perspective. Previously, it was an inward-looking concept aimed at preventing Germany from invading its neighbours again. Today, it is about uniting European states to effectively counter external threats, particularly from Russia. Crucially, he highlighted that the nature of EU law, which has been successful in the past, is fundamentally different from what is required for security. EU law functions by activating European citizens against reluctant states, relying on the principles of primacy and direct effect over national law. However, such principles have little relevance in the realm of security. In security, treaty obligations are either respected or they are not. The challenge is therefore not how to bring states on board at the EU level, but how to ensure that commitments are effectively honoured. This is why a shift from unanimity to qualified majority voting in security matters would not work in practice, and why the European Commission, as an independent body, does not necessarily guarantee effectiveness in this area.
Germany presents a particularly peculiar case in this context. First, Germany underwent significant rearmament efforts in the 1950s, yet there remains a deep-seated reluctance to embrace a world where defence and security play a central role. This creates a paradox: on the one hand, Germany accepts its dependence on US security; on the other, defence and security are viewed as sovereign matters. Furthermore, the German army is conceptualised as a Parliamentary Army, requiring parliamentary consent for any deployment of German forces abroad. Second, the German Constitution imposes strict limits on defence spending, further complicating its ability to respond to emerging security challenges.
The third speaker was Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, Professor of History of European Cooperation and Integration at the European University Institute. He argued that the election of Donald Trump could serve as a catalyst for European defence integration, and the EU must draw lessons from its past. While the war in Ukraine dominates today’s agenda, the issue of European defence integration has arisen multiple times before. In the 1950s, the European Defence Community aimed to establish a supranational structure with shared institutions, a common armed force, and a joint budget. In the early 1980s, Christopher Tugendhat, then Vice President of the European Commission, called for a more active EU role in defence. Similarly, in 1993, Jacques Delors, as President of the European Commission, advocated for a fairer distribution of responsibilities and burdens among member states. Mourlon-Druol suggested that the EU could learn five key lessons from these historical episodes. First, European defence integration must take place within a framework of democratic accountability. Second, such integration requires member states to transfer a degree of sovereignty. Third, it necessitates the integration of defence markets across the EU to ensure efficiency. Fourth, security should not be viewed solely as a military matter, as it is closely interconnected with economic stability. These lessons, he argued, are crucial for shaping the EU’s approach to defence in today’s challenging geopolitical environment.
The fourth and final speaker was Federico Fabbrini, a full Professor of European Law at Dublin City University and the founding director of both the Brexit Institute and the Dublin European Law Institute. He began by highlighting that Donald Trump’s re-election would pose an unprecedented challenge for European defence. Trump has been explicit in his rejection of NATO, casting doubt on the security guaranteed by Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and leaving Europe unable to rely on the US as an ally. This, Fabbrini argued, is particularly concerning given that the EU remains largely unequipped to manage its own security. Although the EU implemented several innovative measures in response to the war in Ukraine, it has, in many respects, underperformed. In this context, Fabbrini proposed that the EU should think creatively, suggesting an ambitious idea: reviving the European Defence Community (EDC) of 1952. The EDC was established through a treaty signed in 1952 by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Importantly, it was designed to function as a European pillar within the transatlantic alliance, closely connected to NATO. While the EDC treaty was signed by all six states, it was ratified by four of them between 1952 and 1954. Legally, this means the EDC could technically be reactivated if Italy and France were to ratify it today. However, Fabbrini acknowledged that while this might be legally feasible, political challenges remain. He stressed the need to focus on the internal difficulties within the EU, noting that pursuing the reactivation of the EDC with just two additional ratifications would be far less complex than attempting to reform EU treaties involving all 27 member states.
In response to these challenges, the Dublin European Law Institute has launched a new project called ALCIDE (Activating the Law Creatively to Integrate Defence in Europe), under the direction of Professor Fabbrini and chaired by Professor Sylvie Goulard. ALCIDE seeks to address the geopolitical challenges posed by Trump’s return to office and the threat of Russian aggression following the illegal invasion of Ukraine, using the concept of reviving the European Defence Community as a foundation for enhancing European security.
Click here to watch the event.
Davide Genini is a PhD candidate in EU law at Dublin City University specialising in European security law.