Professor Federico Fabbrini (Dublin City University)
Today, November 5, millions of American citizens will head to the polls to choose the next President of the United States of America (US), and at the same time to elect the 435 members of the US House of Representatives, 1/3 of the 100 members of the US Senate, and to vote for various state and local offices, and several referenda. This election – which in reality has already started several weeks ago, in all those US states that allow for early voting – will have tremendous consequences. In particular, the competition for the US Presidency between the Democratic candidate Kamala Harris and its Republican opponent Donald Trump will affect the future of the US and its experiment in democratic self-government. At the same time however, the results of the elections will reverberate the world over and will be particularly significant for the European Union (EU) and the prospects of its integration.
At the moment, there are 3 unknowns and 3 knowns about the US elections. Concerning the unknowns, to begin with we don’t know yet who will win the Presidential elections, and which party will gain a majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate – which is essential to implement any legislative program domestically. Secondly, with regard to the presidential elections, we don’t know exactly when the final result will become available, because the US federal voting system – and the limited margins with which one of the two candidates may prevail in the swing states – may require careful and time consuming counting and possible recounting of electoral ballots. Most importantly of all, moreover, we don’t know whether the loser of the presidential elections will be ready to accept the results of the vote. Already after the 2020 elections, Donald Trump had challenged the legitimate victory of Joe Biden, attempted to overturn the result of the democratic vote, and ultimately mobilized a mob which on January 6, 2021 stormed the Capitol – the seat of the US Congress – with the aim to prevent the certification of the electoral votes in favour of his rival. Although this time it will be Kamala Harris, in her role as Vice President in office, and thus ex officio president of the US Senate, to supervise this formal process, there is significant concern that Donald Trump, and several violent political movements associated with him, may use force to oppose the peaceful transition of power.
This takes us to some of the certainties – things we already know at the dawn of this historic election. The first thing we know is that the US is a profoundly divided country. Notwithstanding the fact that Donald Trump handled its presidency from 2016 to 2020 in a confused and erratic fashion (especially in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic), notwithstanding the fact that he has been convicted by a court in the state of New York for fiscal crimes, and notwithstanding the fact that he has openly challenged in the electoral campaign the principles of democracy and the rule of law, giving credence to conspiracy theories and blatant falsehoods, roughly one American out of two (among those willing to cast their votes) is basically ready to elect him to the White House. Political polarization in the US – a pattern that has been for some time the object of extensive research in political science and communication studies – has divided the country in two Americas, who are ever more incapable to communicate. This reduces the margin of compromise which is necessary for the good functioning of a democracy.
Otherwise, my experience of living in the US – a country which is geographically vast, culturally diverse and sociologically complex – makes clear that this polarization is not likely to decrease. And this is the second certainty: whatever the result of these elections, we know the US will remain a divided country – even if Donald Trump were to lose both the popular and the electoral college vote. Beyond his personality, through the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement Donald Trump has reshaped the Republican Party, and his political positions are now largely shared by Republican elected representatives in federal and state legislatures. In fact, Trump has become the standard bearer for a socio-economic coalition, which weirdly brings together blue-collar workers in poor and de-industrialized areas of the nation, with ultra-rich techno entrepreneurs at the frontier of digital transformation like Elon Musk: this coalition identifies in Trump’s hostility against globalization, as well as against state regulation and taxation.
From this follows a third certainty, which is especially crucial for the EU. Beyond the outcome of the vote today, it is time for the EU to increase its strategic autonomy and its capacity to act, especially in the field of defense, so as to reduce its structural dependency from the US. If Donald Trump were to win the Presidency of the US, this would lead to the almost certain end of NATO, and with it of the American security shield on Europe, and support for Ukraine. However, even if Kamala Harris were to win the Presidency, we can’t bet that the US Congress – which has the power of the purse and a key role in the conclusion of international agreements – will have a Democratic majority. If this will not be the case, it is quite possible that a Trumpian legislative majority will call into question the international role that the US has played since the end of WWII. In any case, whatever the outcome it is neither reasonable nor justifiable for Europe to remain breathless every four years, awaiting the results of the US election. Put otherwise, the future of Europe cannot depend on a few undecided voters in Pennsylvania or Georgia. While there are several unknowns about the US elections, we do know the EU can and must do more to take care of itself.
Federico Fabbrini is Full Professor of European Law at the School of Law & Government of DCU, the Founding Director of the Brexit Institute and of the Dublin European Law Institute (DELI).
The views expressed in this blog post are the position of the author and not necessarily those of the Brexit Institute blog.