Dr. Kenneth McDonagh
For the third time in a row, Donald J. Trump has received millions of votes in a US presidential election. For the second time, these votes convert into a victory in the Electoral College, welcome to the second Trump administration!
So what are the lessons here? Trump won because of who he is and what he campaigned for. Explaining away support for him at this point is wishful thinking of the highest order; those who oppose Trump’s agenda both in the US and abroad need to be clear eyed about the challenge ahead. We’re not going back? A whole bunch of folks begged to differ.
Europe has been living in denial since at least the 2016 election (and arguably since 2008 and the Russian invasion in Georgia) about the need to take its own defence and security seriously. Looked at from within the EU bubble, the changes in defence policy since 2016 and particularly since 2022 are remarkable. But the reality is that everything that has been achieved remains a day late and a dollar short. Arms production lags behind even the level required to keep Ukraine supplied let alone restock EU armouries, and there is no sign that plans to meet further escalation are in place.
Maybe this shock will be enough to change attitudes, but Europe’s view of Trump is not uniform. His victory has been welcomed by several European governments and celebrated by parties currently in opposition but emboldened about their future prospects. So what are the options?
During his first term, the one consistent strand in Trump’s foreign policy was his transactional worldview, if you wanted something there had to be a payoff. The temptation for Europe will be to beef up the order books of US industry in return for continued US support for NATO and Ukraine. In the short term, this temptation will be impossible to resist but it is not a strategy for long term success. Europe needs to learn to walk the walk of being a geopolitical player without its addiction to US support.
For Ukraine the situation is grimmer. Trump (and the Republicans in the House of Representatives) have made clear that they want the war to end and are unwilling to continue military support. The EU cannot plug that gap unless EU states were willing to put boots on ground. It seems unlikely that Trump’s election has shifted the calculus that much. In the very short term the best that can be hoped for is the outgoing Biden administration and European countries lift the shackles on Kyiv’s use of Western technology so that in the short period from now to January 20th, Ukraine can create more positive facts on the ground before being forced to sue for peace. But let’s not lose sight of the gravity of what will happen here, Russia will benefit from the crime of aggression, its war crimes in Ukraine to date will go unpunished and people who have already been subjected to brutal occupation will be expected to accept Russian authority or permanently flee their homes.
In Gaza, Trump’s victory has snuffed out what little hope there was of a shift in US policy. Netanyahu, who like Trump is fighting to keep out of prison, will feel emboldened and the slaughter will continue. The lives of the remaining hostages mean as little to the current Israeli government as the Palestinians they kill on a daily basis. The West Bank will likely be next. Again aggression and war crimes will go unpunished, and the risk of a wider regional war will remain.
Ireland, like most small states, has relied on the benign conditions of a stable multilateral international order to carve out its own prosperity and, by default, its security. Trump’s protectionist instincts present a real risk to our economic model and the shifting geopolitical environment bring significant security risks to our shore. The changing character of Western politics more broadly challenges any simplistic call to pick a side. The politics of Trump is, unfortunately, not an outlier – the Netherlands, Hungary, Italy, and Sweden all have far right elements either in or supporting the government. Other countries face significant far right parties at local and national level including France and Germany. So what are the likely scenarios?
In reality most Western governments are unlikely to hit the panic button. They survived Trump 1.0, they will think they can do it again through a combination of flattery, bribery and forbearance. This will be helped by the increasingly Trumpian complexion of their own electorates and policies. Sure Europeans looked down on his wall, but they did so while turning a blind eye to our moat. Muddling through remains the most likely option and there’s little to suggest that the plight of Ukrainians or Gazans will shift that calculus very far.
On a different scale, Europe’s economy is vulnerable to Trump’s protectionism. While the main target of his ire is China, a trade war will damage Europe’s already anaemic recovery from post-Covid inflation and an economic downturn could well accelerate the political changes in member states. The EU has prepared counter-measures should Trump target Europe with tariffs and is prepared to use them.
The implications for Climate change are even more grave.
For Ireland, muddling through is the most likely option too but it would be at least prudent if we started to take the risks to our future wealth and security seriously. What does a small, open economy and a state with a strong record of support for multilateral institutions do when the foundations of both those pillars of our statehood are under threat? What are the trade-offs between our interests and values when deciding between Trump’s America and a more coherent, if also more Trumpian, EU?
Ireland heads to the polls in the next few weeks, foreign policy rarely has an impact on our general elections but those seeking the office of government should be thinking through their answers to these questions because the room on the sidelines is shrinking and may vanish soon.
Kenneth McDonagh is Associate Professor in International Relations in the School of Law and Government.
The views expressed in this blog post are the position of the author and not necessarily those of the Brexit Institute blog.