Davide Genini (Dublin City University)
The future of EU-UK relations appears to be on the cusp of a significant shift. After 14 years of Conservative leadership and limited progress since the UK exited the EU in 2020, Labour’s landslide victory in July 2024 has opened the door for a renewed post-Brexit partnership. The new government’s ambition to finalise a formal security pact “complementary” to NATO, combined with promises of a “reset” in EU-UK relations discussed at the European Political Community, sets the stage for increased collaboration in key areas.
The meeting between UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 2 October 2024, culminated in a Joint Statement that signals a potential turning point. This builds on shared values and suggests enhanced cooperation, particularly in addressing climate change, energy, and security.
A key aspect of this renewed partnership is the alignment of the EU and UK on foreign policy, with ongoing support for Ukraine as a top priority. The EU has committed over €100 billion, while the UK has provided €15 billion, positioning them as the first and third largest global donors, respectively. The two also coordinated sanctions against Russia and Belarus in alignment with the US, particularly within the G7, making Russia the most-sanctioned country in the world. Additionally, both the EU and UK have affirmed Israel’s right to self-defence and pledged to work together to de-escalate conflict in the Middle East, aiming for ceasefires in Lebanon and Gaza in line with UN resolutions.
However, tensions persist, particularly over defence strategies. The war in Ukraine has prompted the EU to pursue greater strategic autonomy in defence, while the UK favours increased EU defence spending through NATO. The creation of the EU’s first-ever Commissioner for Defence and Space underscores the bloc’s commitment to this path, potentially complicating cooperation with the UK.
While foreign and security policy cooperation is moving forward, other areas are more contentious. Migration remains a point of friction, with the EU expressing concerns over the UK’s Rwanda immigration policy and its compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. Despite pledges in the Joint Statement to uphold international law, it remains unclear whether the UK will adjust its migration policies to align with EU standards.
Additionally, key elements of the post-Brexit regulatory framework have yet to be fully implemented. The UK’s border controls on EU imports and the ‘not for EU’ labelling under the Windsor Framework are still not operational. The ongoing negotiations over Gibraltar and the looming expiration of tariff exemptions on electric vehicle exports also pose potential flashpoints. The implementation of new powers for Northern Ireland Assembly members under the Windsor Framework remains a politically sensitive issue.
Both parties have committed to the “full and faithful implementation” of post-Brexit treaties. A follow-up meeting is planned for autumn 2024, with the aim of convening an EU-UK summit in early 2025 to assess progress and explore deeper cooperation. However, the full potential of EU-UK relations remains constrained as long as the UK remains outside the single market and customs union. Even in defence and security, EU protectionism aimed at bolstering the European industrial base limits UK involvement.
The rhetoric of “Global Britain” has faded with Labour’s rise to power, and the UK appears increasingly drawn back into the EU’s regulatory orbit, driven by shifting geopolitical circumstances. However, the EU is likely to proceed cautiously in defining the future course of relations, regardless of which party is in power in the UK.
Davide Genini is a PhD candidate in EU law at Dublin City University specialising in European security law.
The views expressed in this blog post are the position of the author and not necessarily those of the Brexit Institute blog.