Ronan McCrea (University College London)

Change is inevitable in political life. Indeed, the famous Dutch-American political scientist Arend Lijphart showed that the alternation of power between different parties is a key ingredient in the stability of a democratic system. However, unlike today, when elections such as those in France threaten to destabilise key features of the political system, for most of the post-War period, politics in Western Europe managed to combine regular changes of government with a high degree of political stability. 

This combination of change and stability was possible because, in contrast to the pre-War period in which the strength of fascism and communism meant that both right and left contained strong elements who rejected the democratic order, in post-War Europe it was moderates such as Christian Democrats and Social Democrats that dominated the political scene.

These parties had significant disagreements. Social Democrats tended to favour more redistribution and higher spending and Christian Democrats were normally a bit more socially conservative. But crucially, they agreed on certain fundamentals. In most of Western Europe, this centre right-centre left consensus extended not only to respect for liberal democracy but to certain other key policies such as support for European integration, organising common defence through NATO and, in recent times, some degree of action to tackle climate change.

This provided a high degree of stability because it meant that when voters tired of a particular government, as they inevitably do, the change of power would not disturb the consensus on these issues. When French voters switched between the Gaullists and Socialists or German voters threw out the Christian Democrats in favour of the Social Democrats, key long-term commitments of France and Germany to the EU, NATO or liberal democracy were not put into question. Even when more extreme parties did enter government as when Jorg Haider’s Freedom Party was, to widespread dismay, included in the Austrian Government in 1999, or the French Communist Party entered a coalition with the Socialists in 1981, centrist forces were strong enough to insist that they would lead the government, thus ensuring that radical policy change did not occur.

The reason that elections in recent years seem to have become so much more consequential and potentially destabilizing is that in a number of European countries the decline in centrist parties means that radical parties of right and left can now hope to lead governments, not merely prop up a more centrist party. This in turn has meant that the key political division is no longer between right and left but between centrist parties and more radical parties on both right and left who, in different ways, reject the longstanding centrist consensus on key principles and policies. 

This is most visible in the European Parliament where the key question in the recent elections became whether the centrist forces (Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Liberals and Greens) could obtain a large enough majority to minimize the influence of the more Eurosceptic parties of the radical right and left. But this trend is also visible in national elections. For example, in the UK the steady rise of UKIP (later the Reform Party) broke the consensus on the UK’s EU membership that had existed between Labour and the Tories leading ultimately to Brexit. Perhaps more importantly, in France back in 2017, the emergence of Emmanuel Macron’s centrist movement devastated the centre right Gaullists and centre left Socialists who had dominated post war French politics. 

For some, centrism provided a welcome opportunity to advance some of the causes on which centre right and centre left agreed. But it also meant that opposition to the Macron government was dominated by more radical forces: on the right by Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National and Jean Luc Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise on the left. Both of these parties depart notably from the post war consensus on issues such as support for European integration, NATO and support for Ukraine in its war with Russia.

This is a story that can be seen in a steadily increasing number of EU states. In Hungary the annihilation of the centre left in the early 2010s paved the way for the radical policies of Viktor Orban on issues such as the rule of law and later, the war in Ukraine. Similarly, in Poland the collapse of the centre left in the 2000s meant that elections were largely fought between the centre right (currently led by Donald Tusk) and the populist PiS party which, like Viktor Orban, rejects key pillars of the post war European consensus. In countries like Italy and the Netherlands formerly dominant centre right forces have suffered major reverses and have been overtaken by more hardline parties led by Giorgia Meloni and Geert Wilders.

That said, for the moment, in most places, centrist forces are still in the majority. The European elections resulted in a Parliament with larger numbers of radicals of left and right but in which the centre right and centre left was still in control. Keir Starmer’s Labour Party may have won only a third of the votes but his centrist orientation is shared by the Liberal Democrats and a declining band of centrist Tories. Even in France, although opposition to Macron is dominated by the far right and far left, the far right ultimately performed well below expectations in the parliamentary elections and a combination of the President’s party plus the remaining Socialists and Gaullists still holds a slender majority of the seats in the National Assembly. What is more, the leftwing alliance that includes the Socialists and Greens as well as the more radical La France Insoumise, has been riven with division and has been unable to unite around a candidate for the prime ministership.

However, this does not mean stability of the old order is coming back. Voters eventually tire of all governments. In the past throwing out a ruling centre right party meant its replacement by a centre left alternative (or vice versa). This meant that whatever the outcome of the election, certain key values and policies would not be placed in question. That is no longer the case. With radical right or radical left led governments a real possibility, the continuation of fundamental principles of liberal democracy and key long term policies that were previously a matter of consensus can no longer be guaranteed. 

France now finds itself facing chaos with the National Assembly hopelessly split with no chance of a majority for any potential government. What is more, with opposition to Macron’s unpopular centrism dominated by the hard-left and hard-right, the next Presidential election could easily result in the election of Marine Le Pen or a figure from the left who shares Jean Luc Mélenchon’s hostility to NATO and the EU. Britain could easily find itself in a similar situation in five years’ time. There is a significant possibility that the success of the Reform Party in the UK will radicalize the Conservative Party in the way that the Tea Party’s success in the early 2010s radicalized the Republican Party and paved the way for the rise of Donald Trump. This may mean that when British voters eventually tire of Keir Starmer, voters may find that the main alternative to his government is a radicalized opposition.

What should centrist forces do? This rise of the radical right and radical left places centrist parties across Europe with a real dilemma. Do they try to create centrist grand coalitions to try to keep more radical parties out of power or do they prop up more radical parties and hope to constrain them in office? Either path is fraught with risk. Grand coalitions that unite centre left and centre right to keep the extremes from power leave voters with no choice other than radical parties once they tire of the existing government so may end up strengthening radical forces in the long run. On the other hand, propping up more radical parties can also strengthen the extremes and consign moderate parties to the marginal roles. 

In Austria, the far right Freedom Party suffered a major loss of support once it had been forced to endure the compromises of office following its entry into government for the first time in 1999. On the other hand, the Italian centre right parties have found that being in office with the far right means that they have been reduced to being a small element of a  government dominated by Giorgia Meloni’s far right allies. In France, the Gaullists have become a minor party split between those willing to cast their lot in with Marine Le Pen and those who saw doing so as a betrayal of their republican values. It remains to be seen what will happen to the Dutch centre right following its recent decision to enter a government in which Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party is the largest grouping. Similar dilemmas abound in the centre. Centrists in the UK Labour Party who split off during Jeremy Corbyn’s tenure as leader faced political oblivion while those who stuck it out are now in power. In France, the Socialists are facing similar problems with many finding it hard to reconcile their beliefs (such as support for European integration) with those of their senior partner in the left wing alliance.

Either way, the old order is clearly on the way out. The key change is that the stability provided by a system dominated by centre right and centre left parties who agreed on key fundamentals is no more. Basic principles like the rule of law and policy choices such as support for European integration that are so fundamental that they influence all other policy matters are now on the table in election campaigns. Contests of the 70s, 80s and 90s between figures who shared a host of underlying commitments such as those between Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin, Helmet Kohl and Helmut Schmidt or John Major and Neil Kinnock which seemed so fraught and consequential at the time may increasingly look almost quaint in their low stakes compared to the coming contests of the 2020s.

 

Ronan McCrea is a Professor of Constitutional and European Law at the Faculty of Laws at University College London.

The views expressed in this blog post are the position of the author and not necessarily those of the Brexit Institute blog. 

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