Brexit Institute News

Event Report – European Security & Defence: Irish Neutrality and European Peace Initiatives

Federica Fazio* (Dublin City University) and Lucrezia Rossi** (DCU Brexit Institute)

Last week, the DCU School of Law and Government hosted a talk on “War in Europe. European Security & Defence, Irish Neutrality & European Peace Initiatives” to close the academic semester. The event featured a talk followed by a Q&As session with Deputy Charles Flanagan, Former Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Chair of the Dáil’s Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs & Defence, organised by Dr Ken McDonagh and Dr Markus Pauli.

In his speech, Deputy Flanagan gave some important insights on the past and future of European security and defence, as well as Ireland’s place in it. He started by reminding the audience that 1991 marked an important turning point in European history; on the breakup of the USSR, a referendum for independence was held in former Soviet countries. At the time, however, the EU role in security and defence was quite marginal, to the point that then-Foreign Minister of Belgium Mark Eyskens described the bloc as an “economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm”.

The former Foreign Affairs Minister then went on to say that looking back at the speech Vladimir Putin gave on July 12, 2021, it is hard not see how it represents a major statement of Russian domestic and foreign policy. In that (in)famous speech, Putin described a history of unity of Russia and Ukraine, and claimed he did not and never would recognize the independence of Ukraine or any other neighbour, including Georgia, Moldova, and Belarus.

The illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation was Europe’s 9/11, according to Flanagan. The casualties from the war in Ukraine have in fact even surpassed those suffered on that tragic September day of over twenty years ago in New York City. Beyond that, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has had significant consequences for every European country, especially Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark. In fact, just last week, Finland officially became NATO’s thirty-first member and Sweden is also en route to joining the Alliance, as soon as Turkey gives its consent. As for Denmark, it held a referendum about the EU defence opt out last year, following which the country recently joined the European Defence Agency. Last but not least, Germany’s U-turn on defence spending and arms support to conflict zones was also of great significance.

But, what does the conflict mean for Ireland? Certainly, it portends a more intensive relationship on the matter of the 2022 EU Strategic Compass. As debate on the Strategic Compass intensifies, a clear framework in terms of investments, targets (such as ensuring the EU has a more robust and flexible mandate), and partnerships can be identified. Ireland has made significant commitments on partnerships. However, it also needs to look at its own defence in terms of available resources and capabilities, as already highlighted by the Defence Commission Report on the Irish Armed Forces, published before the Strategic Compass was agreed. The Strategic Compass, coupled with investments in the European Defence Fund (EDF), has already set the course for Ireland. Independently of how the country will deal with NATO, EU security and defence are going to advance anyway, said Flanagan. Therefore, Europe needs to be charting its own course and Ireland learn from Finland and Sweden and relinquish its neutrality.

The fact that NATO has provided security for Western Europe for over seventy years has allowed Irish parties and politicians to avoid any decision-making on the matter of joining the Alliance. Ireland still focuses a great deal on promoting its own security guarantee from the United Kingdom (UK) to the East and the United States (US) to the West. It relies in fact on the air and maritime assistance of both the UK – which notwithstanding Brexit is still very much a major player in the field of security and defence – and the US – whose special relationship with Ireland is reason for great envy in Europe. Ireland’s traditional policy of military non-alignment informs its active engagement in peace support operations and crisis management. Ireland’s international reputation in terms of peacekeeping missions is in fact highly regarded, but that has now become less than satisfactory, according to Flanagan. The Irish annual defence budget is currently a mere €1.2 billion. The reason for such reluctance to invest in the Army is that Irish politicians rarely talk about Irish as well as European security and defence. But Deputy Flanagan thinks this is changing.

In the past, debates around Irish security had been mistreated in the context of EU referenda the country held on both the Lisbon and Nice Treaties. However, recent opinion polls show that 52% of the Irish people are now in favour of Ireland joining NATO. Despite the fact that there is no requirement under the Irish Constitution to have a referendum to join NATO, Ireland would probably have one anyway; the current Chair of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence however, does not see that happening in the life of the current government. He also stressed that Ireland has a huge level of support from Brussels, but that after Brexit, it is now “an island behind an island that is no member of the EU”. This is a challenge and will be a challenge.

Finally, Deputy Flanagan pointed out that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, a shift towards Central and Northern Europe has been taking place. Nordic and Baltic EU member states appear to be taking stronger leadership positions in security and defence as compared to Germany and France. As a consequence, there is a deliberate policy on the part of Ireland of developing closer relations with the Nordics and Baltics; Ireland’s application to join the Artic Council is a clear example.

 

* Federica Fazio is a PhD Researcher in the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University & a Visiting Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales

**Lucrezia Rossi is the Project Coordinator of the DCU Brexit Institute

 

Photo Credit: Federica Fazio

The views expressed in this blog reflect the position of the author and not necessarily that of the Brexit Institute Blog.