Michael Cox (LSE)

‘Great Peril’

The current crisis involving Russia, Ukraine, the United States and the European Union is, by any measure, the most serious facing Europe since the end of the Cold War. As was recently pointed out by one of the less alarmist British newspapers, Europe was facing a ‘moment of great peril’.[1] With somewhere up to a 130,000 Russian troops massed on Ukraine’s borders, and Putin in no mood to compromise on what he believes is his legitimate demand of preventing Ukraine joining NATO, there would seem to be no diplomatic way out. 

Nor does Russia’s closest ally appear to be helping much. China may not be keen to get sucked into a war against a country with which it now has significant ties. No does it want to upset its economic partners in Europe. But thus far it has not flinched in providing diplomatic cover for Russia. As the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made clear in January, Russia’s complaint that its security concerns had hitherto been ignored by the West was an entirely legitimate one. This is why Russia’s demands for a new European security architecture should be ‘taken seriously’.[2]

How seriously was made clear in early 2022 when Putin and Xi Jinping met in Beijing. In the lengthy communique which followed, there was no talk of war and little was said about Ukraine. Even so, the joint statement more than implied that China and Russia together were set on challenging the West and America’s right to run the world. A ‘new era’, multipolar in character and organized around actors who did not ‘interfere in the internal affairs of other states’, beckoned.[3]  

Invasion?

But even if we accept that the relationship between China and Russia has introduced a quite new element into the current crisis[4] – some analysts in Beijing even now talk of China’s ties with Russia as being ‘stronger and better than an alliance’ – this brings us no nearer to answering the more urgent question: has Russia finally decided to invade Ukraine? If opinion polls are to be believed, most Europeans assume it will happen at some point in 2022. Chatham House believes the moment of ‘maximum danger’ is now upon us.[5] NATO argues it will almost certainly happen. And we have been informed by President Biden no less that Putin has already taken the decision to invade Ukraine.[6] It is all very alarming, and if the various intelligence reports are to be believed, quite convincing too. Clearly we are living in dangerous times. 

Yet without sounding either naïve, complacent or even optimistic about the current situation, there may perhaps be good reason to think that an all out invasion may not happen, not because Putin does not have plans to do so (he clearly does) or because he thinks Ukraine should be a sovereign nation (he obviously does not)[7] but rather because an invasion may not serve Russia’s interests. Recognizing the breakaway republics in eastern Ukraine is one thing; engaging in a more general campaign of disinformation and cyberwar virtually a given. But that is not exactly the same as a full-scale invasion. Which only raises the obvious question: then why park thousands of Russian troops on Ukraine’s borders if you’re not going to use them against Ukraine directly? 

Enter Sun Tzu

At this point most writers on strategy would either reach for their Thucydides or their Clausewitz. But we would perhaps be better advised to turn to the great Chinese writer on military affairs, Sun Tzu. As he reminded his readers well over two thousand years ago, war is an art form involving the kind of deception of which Putin is a past master. But as he also went on to argue, if one actually wanted to ‘to subdue the enemy’ then better not to fight at all. That he concluded was the ‘acme of skill’.[8] Now whether Putin has studied Sun Tzu is not at all clear. But there is every chance that Putin – like many other modern masters of strategy – may have learned a number of lessons from Sun Tzu and has been applying them accordingly.[9]

So what has he learned, and what is he hoping to achieve? 

One thing clearly is to try and force Ukraine into making significant concessions. It is a high risk strategy which could backfire. But thus far by engaging in coercive diplomacy in the way in which it has done, Russia has already caused a series of problems in Ukraine itself. As Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council has suggested, Russia’s real goal is not to invade Ukraine so much as to destabilize it, and by so doing weaken it from within. One recent report outlined just a few of the downside consequences that have already happened. As it pointed out, ‘every report of another Russian plan to invade Ukraine is a blow to its economy, weakening the hryvnia, pushing up interest rates, and sowing panic among the public’.[10] Ironically, the US only appears to have contributed to Ukraine’s problems by advising all non-essential staff to leave the country as soon as possible. 

The second objective for Putin has been to further exploit any and all divisions within the West itself. Bruised by the Afghan withdrawal in August 2021 (after an even more bruising four years of Trump) NATO still soldiers on. Putin’s aggressive policies may have even breathed new life into an organization that President Macron of France at one time claimed was ‘brain dead’.[11] Nonetheless, in spite of public displays of unity there look to be some fairly big differences between what we might loosely describe as the “Anglo-Saxon” members of the Alliance, and those European countries who have been desperately seeking a diplomatic way out of the crisis, partly to protect their already good relations with Russia (Hungary), partly to prevent the possible cancellation of Nord Stream 2 (Germany) but also in the case of both France and Germany to prove that there is a European solution to the problems facing Europe. Moreover, though Biden has made every effort to lead throughout the crisis, Putin has proven to be a master of the game of divide and rule, negotiating with Macron here, keeping in close touch with Berlin there, while all the time warning Europe that if there was to be a conflict this would lead to an even deeper energy crisis within a Europe which is already teetering along the edge.[12] 

Threatening Ukraine also has the additional benefit for Russia of shoring up its less than secure position in the rest of its so-called ‘near abroad’. Putin may well be the proverbial master in his own Russian home. But all around him he faces a series of very big challenges from Belarus where ‘the speed with which the regime succumbed to popular pressure in 2021 must have ‘made for uncomfortable viewing for Kremlin decision-makers’,[13] right through to oil rich Kazakhstan where what began as a minor street protest in early 2022 soon erupted into a nation-wide movement opposed to ‘inequality of opportunity, corruption, injustice, lack of benefits, fuel prices, low wages and lack of labour bargaining power’.[14] And Ukraine poses an even bigger threat to his rule, which of course is why he has acted so ruthlessly there ever since Kiev sought a new deal with the EU back in 2013. 

Finally, by engaging in a high risk foreign policy directed against the West Putin, it would seem, is hoping to bolster his own position at home. Having the West as an enemy to fight rather than a partner with whom to co-operate certainly comes easy to someone like Putin with his background in the KGB. Indeed, by portraying himself as the strong Russian leader fighting off those in the West who are either seeking to encircle Russia from without while undermining it from within, he is playing a political tune which seems to go down well at home – especially amongst certain generations of Russians who can well remember those good old days when Russia (then the USSR) was feared abroad and could stand tall in the world. Russians moreover do appear to think that Putin is right when it comes to Ukraine and NATO. But as one report from Moscow recently pointed out, it is one thing to back Putin in general, quite another to back a war against fellow Slavs in Ukraine. As was suggested, the Crimean annexation back in 2014 saw Putin’s approval ratings surge above 80 percent. It is by no means clear however ‘to what extent ordinary Russians’ would ‘support Putin’s current actions in and around Ukraine.[15]   

Scenarios 

This in turn leads us to ask an important – but rarely asked – question about the balance of power in the current conflict. Clearly Russia has regional clout and its forces (we are told) would easily overwhelm anything thrown at them by Ukrainians. But Putin as we know is no adventurer. Nor in spite of its local advantage, is Russia itself in an especially strong position internationally. As one of wiser voices in the current fevered debate has pointed out, Putin ‘isn’t playing a strong hand’. With a GDP about half that of California, an economy mainly dependent on oil and gas, and defence spending around 10% or less of that of the US, Russia is hardly the ‘world power’ Putin recently claimed it to be.[16] This may be of little comfort to ordinary Ukrainians who have already suffered enough over the last few years. But it does remind us that in spite of all his strong man posturing and bombastic references to the West’s decline, Russia is not in a great position. 

Of course, this does not guarantee he will not invade Ukraine. Insecure powers like insecure people often act in the most aggressive of ways. Moreover, having marched his troops up to the top of that metaphorical hill he may now find it almost impossible to march them down again without losing face. It is difficult to know. But what then comes next? An invasion of a country it might find difficult to subdue, let alone rule? Russian boys coming home in body bags much as they did after another ill-thought out intervention in Afghanistan? Major sanctions? And a possible rift with its ally in Beijing which has throughout the crisis been calling for a diplomatic solution? We cannot say with absolute certainty that Putin will not invade Ukraine.[17] Nor can we say that he won’t. However, there are many good reasons to believe he might not.[18] Which brings us back to Sun Tzu. Putin might well ignore the Chinese sage and in effect do what many in the West now assume he is bound to and launch a major military intervention into Ukraine. But if he proves to be a good pupil of the great Chinese strategist, he would be well advised to continue to reap the rewards of his current policy of maximum pressure, without running the risk of all-out war. 

 

[1] ‘Drumbeats of War are sounding in Europe’, Financial Times, 19/20th February 2022.

[2] ‘China warns US over Russia’s legitimate security concerns’, Aljazeera, 27 January 2022.

[3] http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770

[4] ‘Ukraine Crisis: Majorities Across EU “think Russia will Invade this year”, survey reveals’ Euronews, 9th February 2022.

[5] Robin Niblett, ‘Russia’s End Games and Putin’s Dilemmas’, Chatham House, 14th February 2022.

[6] ‘Ukraine conflict: Biden says he is convinced Putin Has decided to invade Ukraine’, BBC News, 19th February 2022.

[7]  Putin claims that ‘Russians and Ukrainians were one people – a single whole’. See Vladimir Putin on ‘The Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’.12 July 2021. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181

[8] Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, written some time between 475 and 221BC.

[9] John Gray, ‘What Sun Tzu Knew’, The New Statesman, 29th January 2020.

[10] Konstantin Skorkin, ‘Ukraine’s President Beset On all Sides Amid Fears of Russian Attack’, Carnegie Moscow Center,9th February 2022.

[11] ‘Emanuel Macron warns Europe; NATO is becoming brain dead’ The Economist, 19th November 2019.

[12] See ‘Moscow has the EU over barrel on energy’ Financial Times, 20th January 2022.

[13] Shaun Walker, ‘Putin’s aggressive policies show signs of a worried regime’, The Guardian, 17th December 2020.

[14] ‘Behind the Unrest in Kazakhstan’, International Crisis Group, 14th January 2022.

[15] Uliana Pavlova, ‘Putin is Threatening to Fight a War: Are Russians Willing Fight It?’, Politico, 12th January 2022.

[16] Ronald Suny, ‘I’ve studied Russia for years – invasion was never the point for Putin’ The Independent, 17th February 2022.

[17] See the recent analysis by Harlan Ullman, ‘ Why Putin Won’t Invade Ukraine’, Atlantic Council, 16th February 2022.

[18] See Frank Gardner, ‘Ukraine crisis: Five reason why Putin might not invade’ BBC News, 21st February 2022

 

Michael Cox is Founding Director of LSE IDEAS and Emeritus Professor in International Relations at LSE. Professor Cox was appointed to a Chair in International Relations at LSE in 2002. His latest book titled “Agonies of Empire: American Power from Clinton to Biden” is to be published in March 2022. He is also working on a book for Polity Press called “Comrades: Putin, Xi Jinping and The Crisis of the West”. It will be published later this year.

The views expressed in this blog reflect the position of the author and not necessarily that of the Brexit Institute Blog.